capitalist exploitation of the new forms of labor can only be fought if we fully understand how the socio-political field of struggle is now configured and what the new power relations in it are.

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Rules for the Incommensurable

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1. The Fair of Meanings

In the years between the second half of the 1970s and the explosion of the recession of 1989-1991 (United States) and 1991-1994 (Europe and Japan), the gradual emergence of post-Fordism generated a growing "existential malaise," a climate of pervasive insecurity, a social and political disorientation whose explanation exceeds the conjunctural data.[1] This climate of uncertainty, the "*no future*" widely anticipated by some youth movements of the 1970s, can be attributed to several factors: mass unemployment; the pauperization and occupational instability of ever-increasing sectors of the population; the awareness that investments were creating less occupation and that in absolute numbers they were in fact reducing it; problems related to the aging of the population and the financial difficulties these problems were beginning to cause. But it is only in the years of the recession that what had previously remained latent emerged in its full gravity and complexity. The recession of the early 1990s simply tore away the "veil of ignorance" that allowed us to postpone addressing the new socio-economic paradigm politically.

Before analyzing the roots of this "crisis of meaning" and its most immediate political implications, we need to consider the reasons for the time lag between the processes of social transformation, the emerging awareness of the mechanisms behind these processes, and the crisis of the political forms intended to govern the transformation.

First we should ask ourselves: What are the times of diffusion proper to a new productive paradigm such as today's new "universal instrument," the computer (or "language machine")? Today the computer corresponds to what the electrical motor was a century ago, and the steam engine before that.

In response to a question about the times of diffusion proper to the new information technologies, Andrew S. Grove, founder and CEO of Intel corporation, explained in an interview to *Business Week* that the

experience of innovation is different from that of immigration. A Hungarian immigrant who escaped from his country during the 1956 revolution, Grove arrived in the United States at the beginning of the 1960s. He went on to become one of the famous Silicon Valley pioneers. According to him, the difference between innovation and immigration resides in the fact that immigration is a break, a radical separation between a before and an after, while technological transformation is an experience that is lived minute by minute in everyday life. The latter transition is gradual: at a certain point we find ourselves holding in our hands an electric razor or toothbrush. We actually register the experience of the new "universal machine" when it has *already* become part of our everyday life, when it has already entered our homes and our children's *gadgets.*[2] . Leaving one's own country, as in the biblical exodus, is a different experience because it implies laceration and suffering, and thus the awareness of what is happening in one's life. When we leave, we always think we will come back one day to embrace our friends and family, to see the colors, hear the sounds and smell the air of the country where we were born. If we can't go back, memory will do all it can to preserve what we have left behind:

> There are two types of Hungarian immigrants of my age: the people who were constantly bitching about America because they couldn't find the things they left behind in Hungary, and the people who accepted what was available here as a kind of moral equivalent of what was left behind. Once you got into that mode, you went with the flow and did quite well. The others were still bitching that "they don't have sideways cafés in New York." This is a little like that.3

The "universal machine" affirms itself gradually, minute by minute. When the crisis explodes, revealing to everyone the epochal nature of the transformation, it's already "too late." We can't go back; either we go with the flow or we keep resenting our time. Either we try to extract the "moral equivalent" of a previous time, or we poison our lives with resentment, appealing to ever-fading memories. The new does not erase the past, but only that which makes the past a kind of ballast, a dead weight preventing us from facing the future with intelligence and with the capacity for producing new affect and new political struggles. During this transition, the long time periods necessary for the diffusion of the new "universal machine" clash with the shortness of the average life span. As in the biblical flight from Egypt, we hurriedly take our most precious belongings so that we will be able to "wander" in the new world without getting lost. Normally, these are the things that we can

hide at the border. And the thing easiest to import "clandestinely" into the new world is *friendship*, the "bridge over the abyss" that allows the wanderer to cross unknown territories—the same friendship that Deleuze and Guattari conceptualized before parting forever.[4]

On the basis of such considerations, the following remarks by Andy Grove seem less surprising:

> One of the most dramatic applications of computer technology is airline reservation systems. The reason it's so dramatic is that you bridge time and place to reserve a seat on a flight that is at a different time and a different place, while sitting at the counter. It's a communication application.[5]

What is surprising here is not only the concrete example, which is the most banal and familiar of things, especially when compared to sophisticated discourses about artificial intelligence, but also the reference to a "fourth dimension" which radically transforms even the revolutionary notion of the space-time relation introduced in the twentieth century. Subjectively, we live the daily experience of processes that are revolutionizing our way of viewing things, our categories of thought, our scientific theories, but this subjective and simple experience, which slowly shapes our perception of time and space, clashes with political languages that were created in a different era, and which are emptied of any reference to what we experience in our daily lives.

Political discourse's delayed reaction to the post-Fordist transformation can also be explained with regard to what has happened in the world of scientific research. Academic circles are becoming increasingly closed and restricted, more and more specialized and protective. More generally, the post-Fordist transformation has seen an increase in disciplinary specialization – a multiplication of research fields whose origin is to be found in the obsession of having to measure and quantify everything.

Scientific research's endemic tendency to distinguish between what can be rigorously demonstrated and what can only be discussed ends up opening a rift between two equally important aspects of the discourse on society, "allowing those who dream of the white smock of the 'scientist' to avoid discussing the themes that are most difficult and urgent in the social sphere," in the words of economist Giacomo Becattini. During the post-Fordist transformation, quantitative scientific research, particularly in the economic field, led to *a social de-responsabilization* of economists. This contributed further to the weakening of the critical autonomy of citizens, who were faced with a proliferation of *prêt-à-porter* ideologies that would

have been far more pertinent in the discourse about sports ("success at all costs") than in the critique of our existence.

One could develop an analysis of the insufficiencies intrinsic to the various scientific disciplines, and in particular of the technicalization of disciplinary languages. We will limit ourselves to quoting Fraser's admonition, pronounced over fifty years ago: "When the phenomena of economic life change, the meanings of the words that we use to describe them change too." We could add that scientific thought's "diaspora," its retreat from the most obvious social changes into a quantitative analysis intended to avoid the interrogation of society's general development, is symptomatic of the scientist's *fear* of losing credibility in the eyes of politicians. In many cases, this has fostered various forms of servile careerism. What is more, Nietzsche has explained very clearly how the will to power is at work in quantitative research; the latter "deprives the world of its most frightening aspects. The fear of the incalculable as the secret instinct of science."

Methodologically, the scientific research of the last two decades has adopted a "strategy of deferral." By isolating and rigidifying different disciplines and professions, research has organized itself in such a way that it can defer to other disciplines whatever threatens the internal coherence of its own field of inquiry. One deferral at a time, research has denied itself the very possibility of examining change. In fact, "change" has become the object of a research discipline, aggravating the fragmentation of knowledge by one more compartment of specialized discourse. The mechanism by which the analysis of change is delegated to psychology, sociology, or even technology (if not simply to televised debates) has emptied scientific research of every dialectical concept, without which we are unable to understand anything at all.

Some have described our current situation as a "crisis of meaning"—an incapacity to elaborate and propose to all members of society a system of references (ideas, norms, values, ideals) that makes it possible to give to one's existence a stable and coherent meaning, to develop an identity, to communicate with others, to participate in the construction—real or imaginary—of a livable world. This state of affairs is not a consequence of our society being characterized by a radical absence of meaning. The opposite is true: we live in a genuine "fair of meanings" where each of us can "freely" appropriate the images, symbols and myths that s/he prefers. What we lack is a "symbolic order" capable of structuring and unifying the scattered fragments of our lives.

This lack of meaning, intended as the absence of a "symbolic order," is clearly the culmination point of the historical development of capital

and its vocation to uproot and decode everything. The economy, which has never been more global, annihilates ancient rituals and ceremonies, strips nation states of their power, and disaggregates the nuclear family. Races too are disappearing, "drowning" in processes of immaterial production where the colors and smells of every agent can be reproduced artificially. We thought capitalism would create the conditions for perfect happiness by destroying every sense of *belonging*, by the nomadism of the rootless individual that results from the "deterritorialization" intrinsic to the development of the global economy. Now we have reached the apex of globalization and capitalist "deterritorialization," and everything is returning: the Family, the nation state, religious fundamentalism. Everything is returning—but in a perverted, reactionary, conservative way, as the philosopher predicted. At the very time when the "absence of meaning" brings within our reach an era in which human beings finally seem able to speak to one another, by virtue of free access to communication, we are witnessing the return of the idea of "race" and of every myth of origin and belonging. The potential liberty of the "transparent society" turns into its opposite: a racist intolerance that defends the borders of its homeland. The only thing that matters is the myth, the symbol, the semblance of an historical origin capable of dominating chaos with hatred.

At this point, the suspicion arises that those who present the quest for a new "symbolic order," a new "social model," or a "new utopia" as a humanist denunciation of the emptiness brought about by capitalist development are actually constructing their argument on the wrong premises. It's not a matter of contesting the noble spirit of those searching for alternatives to the chaos overwhelming us, but rather of avoiding a situation in which illusions are nourished with further illusions, in which the constant "need for meaning" is met with formulas more likely to aggravate our condition than to improve it.

Before defining the rules needed to prevent the current deregulation from leading into generalized war, it is necessary, therefore, to think about the "places" where rules are born and constructed. In what follows, this will be done by analyzing the "rule" implicit in the (constitutional) principle of the equality of the sexes.

2. The Place for the Socks

The debate over domestic labor, or over the reproductive labor "historically" performed by women, furnishes insights essential to the search for rules and for the *measuring unit* that defines these rules. These

insights are necessary for confronting the deregulation that rages unchecked in the age of post-Fordism.

There is a controversy between those who consider domestic work economically productive and demand its remuneration ("wages for housework") and those who define domestic labor as a form of "labor for oneself" indispensable for the preservation of the private sphere. Those who take the second view demand a generalized reduction of wage labor ("work less so all can work") and a cooperative approach to housework involving men and women alike. The controversy between these two positions is only apparently "old." It is in fact highly relevant to our time.

The critics of the wages for housework model contend that this proposal involves the risk of excluding women from the economic sphere while perpetuating the obligation of men to work full-time. These critics (such as André Gorz) also hold that if we really want to consider the family an autonomous and indivisible unit, we need to establish a perfect *reciprocity* between male and female domestic activities. "Personal services" would then have to be withdrawn from the logic of wage labor and transformed into an opportunity for reclaiming "ownership of ourselves" (or control over the private sphere). This would involve overcoming the sexual division of labor typical of capitalism (a division that implies the double burden of waged and domestic labor for women).

Those are the terms of the theoretical and political debate. It would seem that this way of considering the issue misses several key points. As it happens, domestic and reproductive work has taken the form of wage labor for quite some time, at least tendentially—but it has done so in a way that reproduces class division and exploitation *among* women.

During the past decades, many reproductive activities formerly performed within the family have become services available on the market: food preparation; laundry; house cleaning; care for children, elderly people, the disabled, and the ill. The market for services that involve caring for people, a very intensive kind of labor, has expanded, creating the need for an army of female workers that is increasingly composed of women belonging to "ethnic minorities" or to immigrant groups whose members are "prepared" to accept lower pay. The "salarization" of domestic labor-labor performed by "household aides" within the home and by service workers outside it—has altered neither the sexual nor the racial division of labor, but has created a hierarchy within domestic labor itself. On one side of the division, one finds middle-class women (mainly white); on the other, women who often belong to other ethnic groups and who have little bargaining power.

This development seems to confirm Gorz's hypothesis, according to which we need to reduce the sphere of waged reproductive work ("neo-servile" and poorly paid personal services) in order to re-establish equality not just between men and women but also among women.

But to stop here is to leave the argument incomplete, analytically insufficient and, most of all, politically weak. Ethnological studies have shown how difficult it is to achieve a sexual equality defined in purely juridical terms, without consideration of the real, subjective dynamics at play within the fabric of conjugal life and the relations of partnership.

Jean-Claude Kauffmann, a French sociologist specializing in the study of family and everyday life, writes that "the core of the resistance to gender equality is to be found in the family, in the home, in the most elementary domestic practices."[6] Detailed analysis of domestic work reveals that there is a difference in the *intensity* of the work performed by men and women even when labor time and the level of technological development are the same. According to Taylor's theory of "scientific management," an intensification of labor has occurred when a greater quantity of goods is produced in the same time, with the same technology, and by the same number of male and female workers. The increased productivity results from an acceleration of the rhythm of work, achieved by the elimination of the workday's "pores" (that is, of "dead" production time).

Countless examples could be invoked to illustrate this concept. One is that of the pair of socks. For a man, the socks are in their proper place when a woman doesn't think so at all. She ends up putting them in the place she considers to be the right one. In by-passing the verbal stage and simply putting the socks back "where they belong," the woman creates a new habit that modifies the initial positions of the two partners. She reproduces and aggravates sexual division. Field research shows that, when their partner is away, only 65 percent of men take care of their laundry, compared to 90 percent of women. Similarly, only 44 percent of men iron their clothes, compared to 87 percent of women. The reason lies in the specific function played by clothing in the relationship between the sexes: clothing is a pivotal "tool" in feminine seduction. Technology, represented by the washing machine (constant capital), is certainly helping men to appropriate some domestic activities, but men still refuse to establish an excessively intimate relationship with their laundry, and don't respect it very much. Men have invented washing machines, but clearly this invention has not been sufficient for developing a relation of quantitative reciprocity between men and women.

Women's notion of the "proper place for the socks" has a long history. An infinity of sexual and social classifications are preserved in the housewife's simple gesture. The accumulation of countless silent gestures traversing the entire gamut of domestic labor forces us to speak with great caution of sexual reciprocity and the reconstruction of the private sphere through the equitable distribution of housework. *Even within* a juridical and economic framework premised on sexual equality, the exploitation of women by men is reproduced.

The issue has political implications beyond the strictly domestic sphere—implications concerning the question of measure. No jurist and no economist will ever be able to adequately define the measuring unit by which to equitably quantify male-female parity, except in an *a posteriori* manner. Even with equal rights and working schedules, different histories and sensibilities recreate hierarchies and forms even when their juridical *form* is considered to have been overcome.

The "place for the socks," the silent gesture that condenses thousands of years of sexual role-distribution, poses the question of rights on a *qualitatively* new level. Amartya Sen is right to point out that, in conventional economic theory, "individuals and firms are visible," but families are not, such that the attempt to elaborate an economic theory of the family merely results in the application of market models to exchanges between family members: "Conceptualizing marriage as a 'two-person firm with either member being the entrepreneur who hires the other and receives residual profits' can be called a rather simple view of a very complex relationship."[7]

It's not a matter of questioning the *need* for a measuring device capable of defining as equitably as possible the exchanges that take place between men and women within the family unit. Years of research into the "new forms of poverty" have allowed for the development of "equivalency scales" that allow for improvements in the distribution of wealth between domestic economies, but little attention has been paid to redistribution *within* the family unit (with one exception: the case of single-parent households, in which the child is treated like a husband).

What needs to be discussed is the *nature* of the measuring device. The economic measuring device, which reproduces the juridical principle of sexual equality within the family sphere, reveals a *break* in the very possibility of comparing the work performed by men and women. Family life certainly involves elements of cooperation and conflict—elements that define the "problem of negotiation" between members of the family unit. But the exchange between male and female labor cannot be reduced

to its "unionized" dimension, which is legally regulated by lawyers in the courtroom (as in the cases of alimony payments or divorce). Male-female exchange transcends its "unionized" form. It transcends the quantitative dimension of negotiations concerned only with "precise economic value." This is true even in the best of cases, when the assessment of women's domestic activities involves an extension of the concept of family *patrimony*, such that the income capacities of the husband are recognized as dependent on the wife's willingness to perform a series of supporting duties.[8]

The *idea* of sexual equality is strongly developed on the level of society and on that of contract negotiation, but not on the individual level. Inequality insinuates itself in the rift between representation (universality of the law) and real practices (concrete singularity of habits)—between the *formal* and the *material* constitution. Much like the question of sexual harassment, that of housework involves issues of power and authority. This is precisely why we are confronted with *incommensurable* criteria of valuation. It is useless to pretend that we are eliminating male power simply by subordinating male-female exchange to a common regime of equality. No such regime exists, because the exchange will always involve a *supplement* and a subjective *difference*—a disparity in experience that escapes any reduction to units of measure, to units applied to qualitatively heterogeneous quantities of concrete labor.

As is well known, the problem of measure can be approached on various levels. First of all, there is the need to abstract from the variety of concrete tasks performed: there are those who iron clothes and those who take care of the children, those who work outside and those who work within the home. In the case of domestic work, the process of abstraction is usually effected by comparing the different activities in terms of labor time (where a specialist job requires a certain amount of training time, this time is included in the calculation). However, and as was seen in the example of the "proper place" for the socks, this abstraction is violently thwarted by the "lived history" of women, which problematizes the reduction to temporal units and the attempt to measure the work performed. Even if the hours worked are the same, the tasks performed by women are much more intensive than those of men. This intensity cannot be reduced to a purely quantitative dimension, as if it were the straightforward result of a specialist knowledge acquired over time (from childhood onward); rather, it reflects the division of sexual roles. Behind the disparity in labor intensity lies an entire history of

asymmetrical power relationships. The *power* exercised over women sends into crisis the very possibility of measuring quantities of labor time while applying the same unit of measure to both sexes.

In the light of a careful analysis of domestic work processes, the definition of the parity of rights on the basis of reciprocity, or of the equal distribution of working time between men and women, reveals its profound political inadequacy. The quantity of hours worked may be the same, it may even include the training time necessary for specializing in certain functions, but we conflate in the same unit of measurement subjective and historical experiences that are in fact completely heterogeneous. Within the One—the measuring unit—difference hides (in this case the difference between men and women) and multiplicities dwell.

It has to be clear that what we have said regarding male-female exchange in the private sphere has a *general* significance; it concerns the very core of the paradigm guiding the transformation of the capitalist mode of production. The first to realize that there is a contradiction inherent to the exchange of equivalent quantities of labor time (the exchange on the basis of which wages are determined on the labor market) was none other than Adam Smith, the father of political economy. Smith pointed out that the quantity of work *contained* in the commodities purchased by the worker with his contractually determined wages is one thing, the quantity of work *commanded* during the labor process another. The wage commands more labor than is necessary for the reproduction of the commodities corresponding to the wage. Command is exerted over labor once the worker enters the production process; the worker's activity is completely determined by the machines and the organization of the plant, which belong to the capitalist. It is precisely because of this crisis in measurement, very lucidly indicated by Smith, that economic growth and development occur. In fact, if the salary commands more work than is contained in the commodities corresponding to the wage, this command measures labor productivity and, consequently, *capitalist* growth.[9]

From Smith onward, economic science has done all it could to eliminate the contradiction that lies at the origin of the incommensurable. What economic science has tried to do is eliminate the qualitative aspect, the "place for the socks," the surplus behind which is hidden the history of the subjective difference between those who work and those who give orders. In other words, economic science has tried to solve *logically* a contradiction pertaining to the political sphere of power relations, by

simplifying inherently differentiated and dialectical categories in terms of formal identities. This is how it has evacuated from its disciplinary field the issue of the political origin of the crisis of measure, becoming *economics* after being born as *political economy*. The current crisis of economic indicators reveals how economic science is insufficient for analyzing the transformations taking place today. This insufficiency derives from the very "mission" of economics—from its goal of eliminating the political analysis of power, and of power's effects on micro- and macro-economic variables, from the field of inquiry.

But the "place for the socks" and the crisis of measure it reflects reveal two other things, equally crucial to the current paradigm of transformation.

In the sphere of domestic labor, we are dealing with a kind of labor that is becoming central to the post-Fordist regime. It is *live labor*, where "the product is inseparable from the producer." This labor, which achieves its own realization *within itself*, characterizes all forms of personal service. It continues to expand its reach in the directly productive sphere in the form of relational activities.

This labor is prevalently live labor because, as is evident in the domestic sphere, machinery (constant capital) is less important than personal work. While it's certainly true that the twentieth century has seen technology entering the household and rendering less cumbersome a whole series of domestic tasks (like doing laundry), it is equally true that these technologies have not at all reduced the quantity of live labor performed by women. This paradoxical state of affairs has been demonstrated many times by research on technological innovation's effects on domestic work. The existence of household appliances such as washing machines has not reduced the quantity of live labor; in fact, there has been an increase. This is because the values and the aesthetic and cultural standards involved (the quest for ever more cleanliness, order, and so on) have led women to expand the forms of domestic labor in multiple ways. Instead of bathing the children once a week, we now do this every day. The husband changes his shirt every day. The effect is that of increasing the quantitiy of female labor.

Technology has simplified or eliminated a whole series of physically demanding activities, but the socio-cultural context has caused an increase in the quantity and the quality of live domestic labor. Simply by virtue of being both an element and an effect of a certain socio-cultural context, live labor has assumed a series of characteristics that are becoming increasingly typical of a communicational and relational kind

of labor: by washing and ironing shirts once every two days instead of every ten days (as was done when the standards of cleanliness were less demanding), the wife or partner reinterprets, through her labor, the extra-familial *relational needs* of her husband and children. Her labor reproduces the very possibility of maintaining these external social *relations*. It is impossible to let the husband leave the house wearing the same shirt two days in a row, since this would mean jeopardizing his image and his class status.

Live domestic labor therefore reproduces in the private sphere a public relational context. This is precisely why it is an increasingly *communicative* and symbolic kind of labor, based on the signs, images, and representations of a specific socio-cultural context. In order to be communicative, a woman's domestic activities require an increase in cognitive qualities; she needs to constantly interpret and *translate* into live labor the *signs* and the *information* coming from the context in which the family lives. She decides whom to invite for dinner and what meal to serve in order to "meet expectations," elaborates relational strategies geared towards the improvement of her husband's career prospects, invests in a network of socio-cultural relations to guarantee an environment favorable to her children's education. In this way, live labor becomes less and less material in the mechanical-executive sense and more and more relational and communicative. This does not reduce the quantity of labor, but rather *modifies its very substance*.

The quantity of live labor does not diminish. It has actually increased, thereby contradicting all those theories of technological development that establish a relationship of linear causality between technological innovation and necessary labor. The incorporation of science into machinery or constant capital allows for the elimination of the *industrial* part of labor, the part that is material, operative and mechanical. Parallel to the reduction of industrial labor, there is an increase in the communicative and relational work that resorts to the cognitive and interpretative qualities of the people working in a certain context. The fatigue caused by communicative and relational labor is no longer purely physical, but involves the brain, as demonstrated by the proliferation of new pathologies associated with work-related *stress*.[10]

It is not surprising, then, that during the last few years the focus of women's struggle has "shifted" from mobilization for the right to equality to less visible but no less significant and effective forms of struggle. Relationals dynamics, and hence language, are the crucial elements in the new struggles. This shift only seems to mark a defeat with regard to

male-female equality on the labor market. Of course, the inequality in compensation has not diminished; it has actually increased where other factors (conjunctural, ethnic, migratory) have intervened. Women were the first to be affected by the recession; they were pushed back from the point they had obtained during the phase of economic expansion.

Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the "exodus" *from* wage labor—that is, from the very site of wage discrimination—often began *before* the recession, as has been demonstrated by research conducted in the United States during the 1980s. According to some researchers, the increase in the average number of children per woman can be *partially* explained in terms of the "retreat" into the private sphere that took place when the "long march" across the labor market didn't fulfill its promises.

It is certainly very difficult to establish causal relations in such a complex universe. Nonetheless, the hypothesis can be advanced that, faced with an aggravation of wage inequalities between men and women, or in any case with their persistence (constitutional rights notwithstanding), the shift to the relational and communicative terrain reveals not so much a defeat as a genuine innovation in the tools of feminist struggle. If domestic labor is indeed increasingly of a relational and communicative nature, then perhaps the choice of *language* as the place for defining female identity and difference originates in this mutation. In any case, the persistence of domestic labor explains why women preceded men in developing forms of antagonism proper to the field of linguistic and relational communication.

Language, the *ability* to communicate, is in fact far more universal than the rights inscribed in the constitution. The difference consists in the fact that the universality of rights such as the right to parity is purely formal. As such, it has to contend with the reality of power relations in everyday life, be it at work or in the home. Formal rights are quickly detached from people when we enter the universe of work and the immediate private relationships between men and women. Language, on the other hand, displays a peculiar feature that distinguishes it from formal rights: while it is also public and universal in nature (like constitutional rights), language is never detached from people. It always "transcends" the reality of personal power relations; it is an immanent resource that can be tapped into every time one needs to redefine one's identity and difference with respect to the other who gives orders. Language is the "place" where we can best conjugate the I and the We, the singular and the collective, the private and the public. In the case of feminine language and communication, what is genuinely new compared

to more traditional forms of struggle is the fact that the public sphere *immediately constitutes* a political community.

As Ida Dominijanni points out, the far-reaching political innovation resides

> [...] in the forms that we choose for our speech and for our silence, for changing reality or interpreting a changing reality: for intervening in politics or building social ties. We have never adopted the same forms, the same gestures and the same words used in the politics of men. Often we have been told that we didn't speak or we didn't do enough: the truth is that we acted and we spoke in a different way. [...] The feminine revolution is like this, it doesn't follow either the parties or the classical modes of visibility and conflict. We haven't lost sight of the enemy: we often find him elsewhere than under his classical masks. We have not lost our speech according to a "prudent strategy of retreat": but we don't do politics with press-conferences, and for the most part not even with street demonstrations. The words of women are just at hand, for anyone wanting to listen: in the homes and in the factories, in parliaments, in the unions, in the parties, in the newspapers.

It hardly needs to be added that here

> [...] the stakes are not limited to women, but involve the paradigms of transformation, the realism of utopia. Politics is not played on the table of governments, but in the field of interpretation.[11]

3. Value in the Information Economy

With the first signs of economic recovery—during 1991 in the United States and at the beginning of 1994 in Europe and Japan—it seemed clear that the end of the recession would modify certain fundamental economic relations. One in particular has been discussed practically everywhere: the relationship between investment and employment. The expression "growth without jobs"[12] has quickly become a slogan capable of inspiring both hope and fear: those who lost their jobs during the recession feared not finding a new one, and those who felt liberated from the obligation to work hoped to change their lives in a fundamental manner. The ambivalence of the expression "growth without jobs" needs to be questioned without resorting to simplifications and independently from enthusiasm and anxiety.

One thing is certain: the application of information technology changes the very nature of the *relationship* between investment and occupation, in the sense that the causal linearity that has always linked them is *rescinded*. This means that a certain volume of investment can

lead *either* to a reduction *or* to an increase in the rate of employment. The *significance* of this relationship is not given *a priori*, but rather depends on the choice—made by entrepreneurs, the unions, or the state—of creating jobs that establish a proportion between the volume of wealth to be produced and the *kind* of occupation created.

Ever since the discovery of the "visible physical quantity" that a group of engineers working for the Bell corporation in 1942-43 called "information," we know we are facing a new dimension of matter.[13] Norbert Wiener, one of the fathers of cybernetics, defined information in negative terms: "Information is neither mass nor energy: information is information." Speaking before the American Academy of Science, Boulding said: "Here is the third fundamental dimension of matter." Shannon developed a theory of information as a visible physical quantity that can be used in order to ensure a superior transmission of signals. (The time is the middle of the Second World War, and the Americans needed to protect their naval traffic to Europe with informational systems.)

Defined in these terms, information is the essence of the new productive technologies. The definition of this third dimension of matter is completely tautological: "Information is information."[14] In any case, the tautology is productive by virtue of the rules, the syntax, and the specific *software* that ensure the functioning of this strange linguistic machine. The machine functions on the basis of an elementary unit of information, the "bit" (binary digit). The bit isn't in any way a unit of "meaning." It is a unit that can assume either of two distinct values, normally 0 and 1. The meaning of this information is not determined *a priori*, but depends on the organization of the program and on the way the program is put to use by its operator.

Once information technology is applied to productive and distributive processes, the fluctuation of employment rates follows a logic different from the one that has traditionally determined the relationship between investment in machines and the creation of jobs related to the use of these machines. The spread of information technology renders the creation of jobs problematic because, as we have seen, it determines a crisis of the indicators traditionally used in economic forecasting.

On the one hand, the accelerated development of information technology is rapidly undermining the importance of the software program's physical or material container. *Hardware* prices are falling at a constant rate even as new software programs vertiginously increase the

potential of information technology. This is enough to explode statistical indicators based on the relationship between the costs of fixed capital (machinery) and the financial volume of investments.

On the other hand, the *use* of the new technologies is anything but pre-determined. A new computer can simply be used as a superior writing machine, but it can also become the basis for multiple and extremely productive applications. Everything depends on the kind of organization that is developed "around" the new technologies; it depends on the training programs available in primary schools and schools of engineering, and on the political decision to reduce labor costs, maintain the same rate of employment, or both (by reducing the number of full-time employees and resorting to outside or part-time workers). For now, the logic of this decision is *opportunistic*: in some cases, it is convenient to lay off workers; in others, image-related reasons make it is preferable to wait (today, this is the case in banking and in the insurance business); in still other situations, it is convenient to invest in networks that connect productive units scattered across the world, thereby creating jobs abroad rather than in the country of origin.

One example of the resulting uncertainty over investment strategies and their effects on employment is so-called *reengineering*[15], the latest "trend" in management science.[16] Reengineering, which could also be termed "reconfiguration," consists in a radical modification of a company's mode of operation: a breaking down of vertical organizational structures ("deverticalizaton") and a consistent application of those new forms of information technology (expert systems, videodiscs, telecommunications, and so on) that were previously employed only in a mechanical way, without structural transformation. Reengineering allows company managers to take full advantage of computers by rethinking the very organization of management, rather than by simply introducing computers into pre-existing bureaucratic-administrative procedures, as in the past.

The term "reengineering" derives directly from the field of information technology; it was invented by Michael Hammer, a professor of computer science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Hammer was inspired to coin the term while teaching his customers how to use computers in order to improve company efficiency. The old software programs utilized in company management needed to be dismantled and rebuilt in order to fit newer and more powerful computers. The task was all the more urgent since everyone had purchased a computer at some point after the 1970s, but without obtaining significant returns in terms of efficiency. In many cases, the opposite was true: additional

workers (computer experts) had to be hired. A new cost had arisen—one sustainable in times of plenty, but not in times of scarcity.

People soon realized that the old software programs combined certain *procedures* with an entire organization of labor (characterized, for example, by an excessive segmentation of the work process) and that this was precisely the cause of the inefficiency. Hence the enthusiasm for organizational rethinking: in some cases, this meant a straightforward "restructuring" of the company, that is, layoffs; in others, there resulted original forms of experimentation and innovation that eliminated hazardous or mindless jobs and reintegrated previously distinct functions (abolishing, for instance, the frontier between engineers and *marketing* specialists).

"Reengineering Makes Companies Efficient and Shows Workers the Door," headlined *The Wall Street Journal*, adding that millions of jobs might be eliminated in coming years. According to John Skerrit of Anderson Consulting, this might be the social question of the near future. Paradoxically computers, once synonymous with modernity and efficiency, have become inefficient due to their mechanical and unintelligent utilization, and this has had negative repercussions on people's quality of life. As soon as profits began to dwindle, people appealed to techniques such as reengineering in order to reduce personnel—a sign of the shortsightedness of companies, and often also of unions. Companies investing in the new technologies blindly reproduced the procedural defects that had existed prior to the introduction of computers. Unions failed to demand different and more desirable forms of work when it was still possible, and are now being punished with a net loss of work.

In some cases, the fiscal incentives meant to promote innovative industries produce effects contrary to what was intended: when it becomes more convenient to put to work capital, rather than people, a situation results in which workers are laid off both by the companies producing computers and by those using them. If low-wage labor can be easily recruited, as it can in border regions, mechanization gives way to the extensive use of a labor force whose costs are lower than those of machinery ("Mexicanization"). And if the technical competency of migrant labor increases, as it has in past years, then it may happen that part-time workers are enlisted to mount extremely complicated *chips* in garages or over-crowded apartments, as is now the case in Silicon Valley.

Reengineering is simply one management technique among others, and is far from being applied in a linear way. Even its promoters admit to a failure rate of between 60 and 80 percent, in a situation where 69

percent of American and 75 percent of European companies are already undergoing "reconfiguration." Without a strategy that takes into consideration the multiplicity of factors involved, even the most intelligent use of information technology risks being totally ineffective.

A fundamental characteristic of the new technologies—on the basis of which investment strategies and their effects on the rate of employment can be analyzed—is the progressive loss of importance of fixed capital, or machinery, in the determination of economic *value*.

Nowadays nobody purchases Apple or IBM stocks on the basis of considerations about the material assets owned by these corporations. What counts is not the real estate or the machinery owned by a company, but its contacts and the potential inherent in its marketing network, the strength of its sales, the organizational abilities of its managers and the inventive capacity of its personnel.

These are the so-called "intangible" assets or goods, true *symbols*, for which we still don't have a statistical or financial measuring device. Since stocks are a symbol of ownership (of a part of the company's profits), and since the capital represented by stocks is also a system of symbols for the "ability to produce" wealth, we are witnessing a proliferation of symbols that endlessly mirror one another. As Alvin Toffler says, capital is rapidly becoming "super-symbolic."

The measurement of the intellectual capital of a company is only in its early stages, but there is already a "movement" of scholars who, having understood the pivotal role of knowledge and of immaterial labor in the "New Economy," are conducting field research in this area. Banks, for instance, have a strong need to know "the value of intangibles" (soft assets) associated with the companies that ask them for credit; companies, in turn, have to be in a position to calculate the value of their intellectual capital in order to create development strategies on a highly competitive market.[17]

The loss of importance of fixed capital in the determination of capital value—to the point where there now exists an entire literature on the "virtual enterprises" of a not-so-distant future—dramatically modifies the categories on which the study of economic value used to be based. "The value of tangible goods can disappear overnight. But how can we evaluate the intangibles?" This is the question raised by Rob Petersen, vice-president of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

First of all, value is extracted during the entire production/delivery process of a commodity/service.[18] The post-Fordist economy is not characterized by the fact that people have suddenly decided to satisfy

their needs with immaterial goods, but by the increasing integration of the activities pertaining to the economic sphere. The basic premises of the new production paradigm are connections rather than separations, forms of integration rather than of segmentation, real-time simultaneity rather than sequential phases. In other words, production neither starts nor ends in the factory. We can therefore affirm that productivity, as a measure of increases in economic value, begins even *before* the worker arrives in the office.

Indeed, in the evaluation/measurement of a company's intellectual capital, the central idea is that knowledge is both an intellectual and a relational material, both content and culture. It's not a matter of creating gigantic indicators, a sort of encyclopedia of knowledge similar to the one created by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, but rather of the elaboration of *maps* tracing a diffuse knowledge and allowing companies to find the "places" where knowledge is born, both inside and outside the factory. The objective is to keep a close eye on the people who remember the formulas, and then to develop the technologies that will "make them talk." According to Arian Ward, a theorist of business engineering, "people think in terms of stories, not of facts." This is why we need to draft maps capable of retracing the "song lines" described by Bruce Chatwin in his account of Australian aborigines: roads, trails, conduits of informal wisdom, "highways of knowledge," metaphors referring to other metaphors, the places where those original pieces of information needed in order to differentiate oneself in an increasingly homologizing market lie hidden. According to the world's first "director of intellectual capital," Leif Edvinson of Scandinavian Assurance and Financial Services, "our financial assets stay here after five o'clock, but a good part of our intellectual capital goes back home."

The specific working activity occurring during the productive process is therefore impossible to measure by traditional criteria. The classic definition of productivity, which relates the value of the finished product to the cost of the factors of production (labor and/or invested capital), no longer has any operational meaning. This criterion of measure was effective in a time when telecommunications, services, and immaterial technologies were neither as diffuse nor as decisive as they are today. Now we are witnessing the birth of "cognitive laborers," a class of producers no longer "commanded," to use Adam Smith's terminology, by machines external to live labor, but rather by technologies that are increasingly mental, symbolic, and communicative. The new fixed capital, the new machine that commands live labor and

makes the worker produce, is no longer a physically identifiable and specifically situated tool, but tends rather to be located within the worker herself, in her brain and in her soul.

This means that the new form of fixed capital is constituted by a network of social and vital relations, by the ways in which production and information are first acquired and later, after coalescing in labor-force, activated in the production process. The progressive de-materialization of the modes of production is accompanied by a sort of *spatialization* of the socio-cultural resources that combine in the composition of "cognitive laborers," the class constituted by post-Fordist immaterial producers. Any social context can become the fixed capital whose combination with live labor makes that live labor productive, and therefore competitive at the international level.

In fact, the human resource of intellectuality is the true origin of value, but this origin amounts to nothing if it isn't captured and transformed into a company asset. This calls for the elaboration of intellectual *structures*, such as information systems, which provide channels of knowledge and constitute the medium for consumer relations. These systems are the basis for the reproduction of the "cartography," for the interaction among different kinds of information. According to the formula developed by Dave Ulrich, a professor at the University of Michigan, "learning capacity equals g times g," that is, it is equal to a company's ability to generate new ideas, multiplied by the company's ability to generalize those ideas.

Productivity cannot be measured on the basis of the quantity of goods produced per hour, nor can it be determined by reference to a specific company or economic sector. What is measured, instead, is a multiplicity of factors characterizing a social and regional space that transcends the single worker and allows her to create wealth by being *a member of a community*. It is therefore no paradox that the same companies where people are studying how to better measure the value of intangibles have suppressed their internal adjournment workshops. It isn't just a matter of (enormous) costs whose benefits are difficult to quantify, but of a new strategy of diffusion/accumulation, which plays out in increasingly *informal* ways. The employees can study written materials, consult their colleagues, or take classes, if they want; what really counts for the company is evaluating the *development* of its human capital, not the amount of money spent on *training* classes. The real evaluation consists in the "social validation" of the intellectual capital developed—that is, in the degree of customer *satisfaction* that can be translated into sales volume.

As is only normal, it is at the moment of *sale* that the human resources activated in the production process are monetized and therefore measured. As abstract value *par excellence*, money sanctions the value of human capital, "reducing it to a commodity," revealing its market inadequacies, and providing information—comparable to inventory data—on where and how to intervene in order to better adapt production to market demand.

One consequence is that investment decisions made on a purely company-based calculation, such as decisions intended to reduce direct compensation or social benefits (indirect compensation) in order to respond to ferocious international competition, risk exposing the company to a "boomerang effect." The company may benefit in the short term, but in the medium and long term such decisions contribute to the destruction of the socio-cultural context in which the company is inscribed, and which is at the very basis of its productive capacity. The accounting methods still common today treat the "brick and mortar" owned by the company as a capital asset, but refuse to consider intellectual capital as an expense![19]

The investment strategies and incentives elaborated by communities in order to promote investment are increasingly based on the growth of the "socio-cultural machinery," of the identity-building "cognitive capital" capable of producing wealth when it comes into contact with live labor. It is also clear that a company is not innovative simply because it invests in advanced technologies: neither technology as such, nor even the "trendiest" management models are capable of ensuring local or regional development. The only innovations truly deserving of social incentives are those promoting the development of the social cognitive capital that is tapped into by each particular company according to its own preferred modalities of development.

4. Spaces of Interpretation

The crisis in the measure of value was obviously bound to reverberate within the different theories of compensation which, from the end of the 1970s onward, have been proposed in order to explain or legitimate certain choices in the compensation policies adopted at the company level. The gradual spread of post-Fordism has caused a complete reversal in the understanding of compensation: compensation is no longer understood as the price of labor-power determined by the application of a specific rule (that of supply and demand), but rather as the result of an *interpretive act* that concerns a set of *rules*. This radical change of perspective

is inscribed in the new way in which most economic problems are now treated: economic theory's center of gravity has shifted from the market to the company. The impossibility of foreseeing everything, the volatility typical of post-Fordism, has put into question traditional models of unlimited rationality, forcing us to define *restricted* fields of rational calculation (limited rationality).

The collective research project "Working Under Different Rules," conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research under the direction of American economist and Harvard professor Richard B. Freeman, has underscored the decisive role of rules and institutions in labor market dynamics by means of a comparative study of North America (the United States and Canada), Europe, and Japan. The results of the study can be summarized as follows:

1. During the 1980s, the discrepancy in compensation increased everywhere, but only in the United States did we witness a consistent decline in "real" wages, particularly in the area of unskilled labor. In the United States, job creation has been made possible by poverty rates that are significantly higher than those of Europe and Japan.
2. Worker representation at the company level (worker commissions) or in specific economic sectors has seriously declined in the United States. In countries like Germany and Canada, worker commissions have proved to be "resilient" institutions, capable of resisting even in periods characterized by a crisis of collective bargaining and a marked loss of trade union power (although in Canada these commissions are concerned only with issues such as health insurance and work safety).
3. In the United States, employees have less access to in-company professional training than in Europe and Japan. In the United States, there is a preference for *learning by doing*.[20] While it increases short-term productivity, this strategy is inadequate in the long term.
4. In the compensation pyramid, the lower class of American workers has a standard of living far below that of corresponding European and Japanese workers. The Social Security network does not provide a sufficient income for the lower strata of the American population. The increase of American poverty rates with respect to those of other economically advanced countries occurred between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.
5. The different dynamics typical of the United States and of other advanced nations can be traced to variations in the capacity of labor institutions to intervene in the determination of wages and influence the quality of training. The role of the state in guaranteeing an adequate level of training has proven to be essential in every country with the exception of the United States.
6. The comparison of the various countries examined shows that effective labor representation at the company level is possible only when it is adequately supported by labor *legislation*.

7. The preservation of the welfare state is essential for reducing the inequalities in gross compensation created by the market economy—that is, for improving the distribution of available profits. This improvement always implies a cost to the community, either in fiscal or in deficit terms.
8. Social intervention has modest effects on the functioning of the job market, especially when redistribution measures are directly or indirectly related to policies designed to re-integrate workers into the world of labor.
9. The inequalities in the different levels of education and training strongly contribute to the aggravation of inequalities in the distribution of income. Policies aimed at increasing the qualified labor-force start positive processes in the quest for increasing income through re-training.
10. Guaranteeing an adequate income to the less qualified sectors of labor helps preserve occupational opportunities for the long-term unemployed. While this income is lowest in the United States, that country also has a lower rate of unemployment.
11. Those European countries (mainly Great Britain) that tried to make their job market more flexible by following the example of the American "model" during the 1980s have not been able to vanquish unemployment in any significant way.

At this point, the question needs to be raised whether the "virtues" of the European and Japanese social systems—which, the researchers conclude, the United States should adopt in order to break out of the spiral "job-creation/pauperization"—can actually survive under a post-Fordist and strongly globalized economic regime.

In all European countries, the recession of the early 1990s has been used to impose "American style"[21] deregulation. The strategy of making employment more flexible in order to respond to market fluctuations in real time is adopted in order to reduce wages and increase the specific productivity of labor. Harassed by an entrepreneurial class that wants them to contain the cost of income replacement (in particular that of unemployment compensation), the European welfare states can only redirect social intervention towards the goal of guaranteeing a survival income, even if this is only possible by the kind of social mobilization that has occurred in France. What is more, the struggle against structural unemployment is only possible if the communicative and relational activities associated with personal services are legitimated in socio-economic terms.

From the point of view of the relation between direct and indirect compensation, the deregulation of the job market brings to the fore the issue of recuperating productivity gains for pensions, disability insurance, and unemployment benefits. According to a study conducted in Germany by McKinsey Consultants, reducing both labor costs and

the financial pressure of social programs without increasing long-term unemployment requires a significant expansion of part-time work.[22]

McKinsey's analysts write that achieving both more flexible forms of production and productivity gains requires reducing labor time for an increasing number of active workers (around 60 percent of the total workforce). The study shows that work productivity can increase between 3 and 20 percentage points when labor time is reduced, thanks to an increase in personal *output,*[23] a more elastic management of demand fluctuations, and an extension of the life span of companies. Work productivity can also expand as a result of a higher motivation to work and a reduction of *stress* and absenteeism.

In the strategy of generalizing part-time work, the transfer of productivity gains is crucial. McKinsey estimates that a 25 percent reduction in labor time should not imply a salary reduction greater than 15 percent, especially in the case of low-wage workers, for whom it is essential that the state guarantees the minimum for survival. What is more, in order to be effective, this model must guarantee the possibility of returning to full-time employment, and the choice to reduce one's working hours must not increase the risk of being laid off when the company wants to reduce its workforce.

Whatever one thinks of the model presented by McKinsey, it is important to underscore that combining flexibility, productivity, and labor cost reduction requires a reduction in working hours. Furthermore, the guarantee of a wage reduction less than proportional to the reduction in hours worked introduces the notion of rules established by the company, the employees, and the welfare state. These are rules that need to include the subjects populating the universe of subcontracting, if one wants to avoid a situation in which resistance to lower wages is responded to by *out-sourcing*.[24] Without these subjects, *the interpretation* of the rules would be incomplete from the very beginning.

Rules and their interpretation are, indeed, the two terms that characterize the most recent income theories.[25] In describing the interpretation of the local and general rules guiding the determination of parameters utilized to calculate total income, productivity rates, and job security, these theories affirm the centrality of the notion of "cognitive dissonance." For the rules to be interpreted correctly, it is necessary to define the *spaces* where these rules can be interpreted by all parties concerned. While it is true that a rule only exists to the extent to which it is applied, it is also true that the application of a rule requires interpretation, and therefore the possibility for the multiple subjects

participating in the definition of the rule to express the knowledge that defines their specific identity.

In other words, the deregulation of the job market calls forth the notion of a space of interpretation, understood as a place for negotiation that is absolutely essential if we want to avoid negative, "American style" consequences for the labor force. Thus defined, compensation becomes a mechanism for the distribution of collective knowledge, a knowledge that needs to be made explicit by the negotiating subjects in order for them to be able to interpret the proposed rules.

In this movement towards the opening of spaces for interpretation, we can retrace the effort to avoid a development in which the linguistic turn of the economy is not accompanied by an equally crucial re-definition of the spaces and modalities of wage negotiation. Instrumental and communicative action should coincide not just in the field of commodity and service production, but also in the space where social relations are reproduced, the space where knowledge and income are distributed.

Translated by Giuseppina Mecchia

Notes

1. See Alain Bihr, "Crise du sens et tentation autoritaire," Le Monde Diplomatique (May 1992), pp. 16-17.
2. English in original. (Translator's note.)
3. "The World According to Andy Grove," Businees Week, June 6 1994, pp. 60-62.
4. See the Introduction, "The Question Then…" in *What is Philosophy* by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Columbia University Press, 1994). We could say that philosophers, in so far as they are "producers of concepts" or "immaterial laborers," share a friendship with their concepts, because the friend is the condition for thinking itself. A philosopher is literally "the *friend* of knowledge."
5. "The World According to Andy Grove" (61).
6. Jean-Claude Kauffmann, *La Trame conjugale. Analyse du couple par son linge* (Paris: Nathan, 1992) 192.
7. Amartya Sen, *Resources, Values, Development* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 371-372. Translator's note: In this passage, Sen is quoting G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family* (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) ix.
8. See Marzio Barbagli, *Provando e Riprovando. Matrimonio, famiglia e divorzio in Italia e in altri paesi occidentali* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990).
9. On Adam Smith's individuation of the contradiction inherent to the theory of labor value, see Claudio Napoleoni, *Valore* (Milan: ISEDI, 1976). It should be noted that the first economist who attempted to solve the contradiction between contained and commanded labor was David Ricardo. Marx, on the other hand, supported neither Smith nor Ricardo; instead, he emphasized the contradiction between the two approaches. Smith's approach is considered valid for the explanation of development, Ricardo's for that of exchange as circulation and distribution of goods. According to

Marx, there is no solution to this contradiction, because we are dealing with two different qualities of labor: contained labor is dead labor, already performed, while commanded labor is live labor, "subjectivity in action" – labor that has to be commanded in order to function in an economic system where the workers are separated from the means of production.

10. See the important work by Juliet B. Schor, *The Overworked American: the Unexpected Decline of Leisure* (New York: Basic Books, 1993) 1-15. See also Barbagli 1990, chapter 6.
11. Ida Dominijanni, "La società degli uomini," il manifesto, September 13, 1994.
12. English in original. (Translator's note.)
13. See Jacques Robin, "Mutation technologique, stagnation de la pensée," Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1993, page 12.
14. On the tautological character of the conventionalist (post-Newtonian and post-Galilean) paradigms of production, see Paolo Virno, *Convenzione e materialismo. L'unicità senza aurea* (Rome and Naples: Theoria, 1986) 37-52.
15. English in original. (Translator's note.)
16. See Michael Hammer and James Champy, *Reengineering* (Paris: Dunod, 1993) and Franco Carlini "Gli stagionali dei chips. USA, alta tecnologia a bassa occupazione," il manifesto, April 6, 1993.
17. See Thomas A. Steward, "Your Company's Most Valuable Asset: Intellectual Capital," Fortune, October 1994, pages 28-33.
18. See Alvin Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam, 1991) 80-83.
19. See the important study by Charles Goldfinger, *L'Utile et le Futile. L'économie de l'immatériel* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1994), particularly chapter 4.
20. English in original. (Translator's note.)
21. English in original. (Translator's note.)
22. A summary of the study by Helmut Hagmann, director of McKinsey's Munich branch, has been published in the Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1994.
23. English in original. (Translator's note.)
24. English in original. (Translator's note.)
25. A summary of these theories can be found in the works of Bénédicte Reynaud, *Le Salaire, la règle et le marché* (Paris: Bourgois, 1992) and *Les Théories du Salaire* (Paris: La Découverte, 1994).